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* * P R E F A C E * *
This document refers to computer networking security issues in
general, as well as to those specific to the VAX computer environment.
It assumes that the reader is acquainted with the VAX computer
software architecture, networking terminology, and DCL, as well as
other operating system software interfaces. Most references are to
the VMS environment; future editions will address these same issues on
the ULTRIX and UNIX computers.
The intended audience for this publication is the system or network
manager of a VAX computer system that is currently connected to the
Space Physics Analysis Network (SPAN) or is planning on connecting in
the near future. Privileges are required to implement most of the
changes and suggestions identified in this document.
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INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
This document is a guide to system security with emphasis on
requirements and guidelines that are necessary to maintain an
acceptable level of security on the network. To have security for the
network, each node on the network must be secure. Therefore, each
system manager, must strictly adhere to the the requirements and must
consider implementing the guidelines discussed throughout this
document.
There are areas of vulnerability within the operating system that may
not be addressed in this manual. However, when a requirement or
guideline is discussed, implementation techniques will be included (in
section 4) for completeness. Information related to computer and data
security is discussed to provide information on implementation
options. Although some items may seem obvious, they are included here
for completeness. References will be made to other sources of
information where appropriate. This information is presented as it
relates to a VAX computer environment. Although current emphasis is
on the VMS aspect, future editions of this manual will cover ULTRIX,
UNIX, and other systems as they become connected to SPAN.
1.1 Definition Clarification
The document includes some information related to requirements and
other information that is considered as guidelines.
The requirements MUST be implemented. They are mandatory for
continued connectivity to SPAN. Throughout this document,
requirements are indicated by the verb "WILL."
The guidelines SHOULD be implemented at the the discretion of the
system manager or the organization. Throughout this document,
guidelines are indicated by the verb "SHOULD."
1.2 System Manager Responsibilities
Network security begins with each user on a computer system. The
system manager is usually the person who takes care of adding,
modifying, or removing user accounts from a computer system and also
is responsible, in most cases, for system security. The existing
system manager position description may need further refinement to
include the following security-related responsibilities:
o Contribute to the development of a security policy for the
system (if what is presented in this document is not
sufficient)
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o Track personnel changes in the organization that might affect
the vulnerability of the computer system
o Monitor all software updates, additions, or deletions to the
system in order to detect any potential occurrence of a
"Trojan horse," "virus," or "-worm"
o Motivate management to give high priority to computer
security awareness training for the organization
o Handle all computer security incidents to completion
Follow standard reporting and documentation procedures as
described in this manual
Consult with the SPAN security manager to reach final
resolution of all security incidents that involve other
networks
Lax security practices on networked computers, especially in a
research environment, can present security problems for other hosts on
the network. Potential damage resulting from a successful break-in is
easily unrecognized, not always fully understood, and, therefore,
easily ignored. System managers are often not concerned with security
and often do not know that the systems are easy targets for
unauthorized access attempts or conduits for break-in attempts on
other SPAN host computers. The following sections highlight
information that affects the security of a computer system.
1.3 Computer Security Threats
There are several ways to identify security threats to a computer
system. They can be categorized as follows:
o User Irresponsibility
Poor password choice
Giving out account/password to other users' files
"Browsing" on the system; reading other users' files
Sophisticated user trying to create a virus, worm, or
Trojan horse
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- Inappropriate setting of file protections
o System Penetrations
Use of holes in operating system
Use of poor security management
Use of dial-in modems or X.25 connections
Abuse of network objects
o Potential Threats
Unauthorized users (commonly known as hackers)
Unhappy employees
Competitors
- Foreign governments
Students
1.4 Inappropriate Use Of A System
Use of a computer and network is inappropriate if it:
o Compromises the privacy of users and their personal data.
o Destroys the integrity of data or programs stored on a
computer system.
o Disrupts the intended use of system or network resources,
o Wastes resources (people, network bandwidth, or CPU cycles).
o Uses or copies proprietary software when unauthorized to do
so.
o Uses a computer system as a conduit for unauthorized access
attempts on other computer systems.
INTRODUCTION
o Uses a government-, corporation-, or university-owned system
for private purposes or for purposes not in the direct
interest of the government, corporation, or university.
1.5 Computer Security Laws
SPAN network security guidelines are based on the following key United
States laws:
o Title 18 of United States Code 1030, entitled The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, which protects against
unauthorized access. It is directed to
"Whoever knowingly accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorization and
obtains national defense information ... obtains
information in a financial record ... affects use
of the computer by the government ... alters,
damages, or destroys information in a Federal
interest computer ... modifies or impairs medical
examinations, medical treatment or care ...
traffics in any password through which a computer
can be accessed without authorization ..."
A Federal interest computer is in brief " ... a computer
used exclusively by a financial institution or the United
States government...or is one of two or more computers used
in committing the offense, not all of which are located in
the same State."
o Title 18 of United States Code 2701, entitled The Electronic
Privacy Act of 1986, which protects against unauthorized
interception of electronic communications. It is directed to
"Whoever intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility and obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
Other computer related fraud statutes include:
o Title 15 of United States Code 1693n, which deals with
electronic fund transfer fraud.
o Title 17 of United States Code 506b, which deals with
copyright violations.
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o Title 18 of United States Code 1029, which deals with access
code, password, logon sequence, credit card, and account
number abuse.
o Title 18 of United States Code 1341, which deals with wire
fraud.
Additionally, with regard to computer security, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has issued Circular No. A-71, Transmittal
Memorandum No. 1, July 27, 1978, "Security of Federal Automated
Information Systems," which requires that each Federal Government
department and agency implement a computer security program.
In accordance with the OMB Circular A-71, NASA Management Instruction
(NMI) 2410.7, "Assuring Security and Integrity of NASA Computer
Processing," was issued to establish the NASA Computer Security
Program to implement the policy contained in NMI 2410.7.
There are many existing state and local laws that pertain to computer
security fraud. There is also the Computer Virus Eradication Act of
'89, which has been introduced to the Senate. This is not yet a law,
but it might become one during the next year or two.
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2 SPAN SECURITY POLICIES
Computer and data security have always been important issues, but
recent advances in remote computer access methods have highlighted the
need for further computer security awareness. This document
establishes a general SPAN policy position addressing computer and
information security for SPAN.
2.1 Password Policy
User passwords on a computer system can be the system's biggest
exposure to outside threats. The actual password, for a VMS system,
is not stored in a normal text string. Passwords are one-way
encrypted and are stored in the SYSUAF.DAT file located in the
SYSSSYSTEM directory. This section will give the system manager a
good idea for a password policy that can be implemented on the system.
There are simple rules that a user can follow in choosing a password.
They are as follows:
o Password Rules:
SHOULD be a minimum of 6 characters
SHOULD be a "pass-phrase" or include special characters
- SHOULD NOT be any part of the user's name or userid
SHOULD avoid company, department, and project group names
SHOULD avoid hobbies, nicknames; and nonwork activities
- SHOULD avoid names of family, friends, animals, or
associates
- SHOULD NOT be all the same characters
- SHOULD NOT be found in the dictionary
- SHOULD NOT be written on paper, saved in files, or
transmitted electronically in mail messages or files
- SHOULD NEVER be put into terminal function keys
o Unprivileged Account Authorization Rules
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WILL be at least six characters in length and SHOULD
contain at least one special character (ex: $, _, etc.).
To set the password length in authorization, do the
following:
AUTH> MOD username/PWDMINIMUM=6
Account owner SHOULD be required to change the password
every 90 days (3 months). To set the password lifetime
in authorization, do the following:
AUTH> MOD username/PWDLIFETIME="90-11
o Privileged Account Authorization Rules
- WILL be at least eight characters in length and SHOULD
contain at least one special character (ex: $, -, etc.).
To set the password length in authorization, do the
following:
AUTH> MOD username/PWDMINIMUM=8
- Account owner SHOULD be required to change the password
every 30 days (1 month). To set the password lifetime in
authorization, do the following:
AUTH> MOD username/PWDLIFETIME="30-n
SHOULD be required to have dual passwords. To set this
in authorization, do the following:
AUTH> MOD username/PASSWORD=(PRIMARY,SECONDARY)
However, beware that use of dual passwords will prevent
explicit network access (e.g., NODEnameBusername
password"::) to an account on the system.
2.2 Captive Accounts
Captive accounts are used on many systems for a variety of reasons.
They are sometimes used to allow people who have no account on a
system to perform some specific task, such as SET HOST to another
machine, PHONE other users, get HELP on how to apply for an account,
or TYPE specific files, such as system descriptions, contact lists, or
a list of SPAN hosts.
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Captive accounts can be very useful, but they are obvious security
threats, since they allow nearly anyone to have some level of access
to the system. Once some access is granted, it is always possible to
increase the access through system bugs, clever tricks, and system
configuration errors. DEC has made statements to the effect that it
is impossible to make a captive account 100% secure, and that one
should be very cautious in allowing them on the system. If one does
decide to implement captive accounts, there are a number of things
that should be avoided and still others that should be done. This
section will attempt to cover some of the major dos and don'ts of
captive account procedure construction.
A captive account is an account that, simply put, is forced to run a
specific command procedure upon login. Being flagged as captive does
not make an account secure. Implementation of adequate security is up
to the login command procedure writer and whoever designs the account.
To allow future writers of such procedures to avoid the mistakes of
the past, the following list of things to do and things to avoid is
presented. Many of these guidelines were discovered the hard way, by
having someone break out of a captive procedure that violated the
rules.
o In System Authorization File
- SHOULD ALWAYS set the CAPTIVE and LOCKPWD flag in
AUTHORIZE
UAF> MOD captive_account/FLAG=CAPTIVE
UAF> MOD captive_account/LOCKPWD
It seems obvious, but more often than you might think an
account is created and used as a captive account, without
setting the captive flag. Setting the captive flag on an
account does three things:
1. It identifies the account as captive for future
manager reference.
2. It disables Control_Y interrupts.
3. It prohibits the specification of all login
qualifiers, such as /COMMAND, /NOCOMMAND, /DISK, and
/CLI, when a user logs in.
It is also a good idea to consider the use of the
DISWELCOME, DISMAIL, and DISNEWMAIL flags. DISRECONNECT
and DISREPORT might be good ideas as well.
This will prevent anyone who escapes the command
procedure from disabling the account for other users.
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This assumes that you have set a password on the account
in the first place. It is also a good idea (though not
for security reasons) to turn the password expiration
feature off for the captive account.
- SHOULD NOT have privileges beyond TMPMBX and NETMBX
Since it is not possible to make a captive procedure 100%
escape proof, the best protection is to make sure that
the account is harmless even if someone does get control
of it. If any privileges are granted to a captive
account, then they can be used to access the other parts
of the system (files belonging to other users, system
owned files, etc.). Some privileges are safer than
others. Things like BYPASS, SYSPRV, SETPRV, CMKRNL,
WORLD, and SECURITY are obviously dangerous and should
never be granted to a captive account. Others, like
TMPMBX and NETMBX, are so common that most system
managers grant them to all accounts, including the
captive ones. This is not always wise. NETMBX allows
the account to SET HOST to other machines on the network
and attempt break-ins, but the record shows the attempt
as coming from your machine. TMPMBX is not as bad, but
it will allow the account to be used to interfere with
your own users (mostly limited to annoyance levels, but
possibly serious interference with work). What would
happen, for instance, if a job started sending large mail
messages to everyone on the system until their disk
quotas were exhausted or the disks were filled?
In general, a privilege should never be given to a
captive account unless it. is vital to the functioning of
the account. Even then, alternatives should be
considered. One alternative is writing a program to
perform the privileged function and then installing the
program with the required privilege(s). This limits the
use of the privilege to the required function and removes
the need for the account itself to hold the privilege.
- SHOULD NEVER give a captive account a system UIC (will
not fall within the MAXSYSGROUP group)
Never set the UIC group number of a captive account to
one of the system group of UICs (less than or equal to 10
octal by default, but check the value of the SYSGEN
parameter MAXSYSGROUP to determine the value on your
system). Giving the captive account one of these group
numbers will automatically grant it SYSPRV privilege and
allow access to sensitive parts of the system.
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- SHOULD ALWAYS try to make the UIC group unique
If you set up the captive account in the same group as
other accounts, it may have access to the other account's
files through the group protection. This is considerably
worse if the member number is not unique as well! You
can check the group number for uniqueness with the
AUTHORIZE command:
UAF> SHOW [groupuic,*]
- SHOULD consider setting the PRCLM limit to 1
Unless the captive account has a need to spawn
subprocesses, this limit should be one. This prevents
the creation of subprocesses through the use of the DCL
SPAWN command or the VMS MAIL SPAWN command, or through a
SPAWN command on an X.25 public pad (see the discussion
above for reasons not to allow the user access to MAIL in
the first place).
SHOULD ALWAYS limit access to the account as much as
possible
AUTHORIZE will allow for specification of limitations on
access to accounts. Access to the account across the
network or through dialup lines, for example, can be
prevented. Also there can be a limit on the hours and
the days that an account is available. Captive accounts
should never be accessible through methods or at times
when it is not necessary. If the account is only needed
between 9 am and 5 pm on Monday through Friday, set it up
that way. If it does not need to be used except by local
users, restrict dialup and network access. There is no
sense in being vulnerable more than absolutely necessary.
- SHOULD disable access via BATCH mode
UAF> MOD captive_account/NOBATCH <cr>
o Captive Account Login Command Procedure
The following section will cover things that should be
avoided when creating a Captive Account Login Command
Procedure.
- SHOULD NEVER use the EXIT or (especially) the STOP
statements
There should never be any way for the procedure to EXIT.
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The only way the captive procedure should ever terminate
is with a LOGOUT command. Having an EXIT or STOP command
accessible through the use of a password will never
remain secure. If anyone figures out how to get VERIFY
turned on (see the INQUIRE command, below), the password
will not be protected. If anyone manages to get read
access to the procedure file, the password is worthless.
It is also possible that they will guess the password as
well. There is no need to have an EXIT or STOP in a
captive account command procedure. It is supposed to be
captive, and it should stay that way.
In the event that one needs to have a nonprivileged
person maintain a captive account (for updating data
files or altering the captive login procedure itself),
any of several things can be done:
1. Set up an ACL entry on the files that need to be
maintained and let the person use the personal
account to do the maintenance. This may not be
practical if disk quotas are enabled and the two
accounts are on different disks.
2. Set up a second account with the same UIC and home
directory as the captive account, and let the person
use this "captive manager" account to do the
maintenance.
3. Let the files and quota be owned by the maintainer's
account (or a special maintenance account), and set
up ACL entries to allow the captive account to access
them. This has the added advantage that modification
of the files by the captive account itself may be
easily prevented through the use of the correct
protections, so that even if someone breaks out of
the procedure they will not be able to do much damage
or create "trap doors" to make access easier in
future. See the discussion of version numbers on
page 12 for further explanation of this subject.
SHOULD NEVER use the INQUIRE command (always use the READ
command)
Use the READ/PROMPT=<prompt>/END=<end_label>/ERROR=
<error_label> command instead. The INQUIRE command
automatically evaluates any symbols included in the
input. It is possible that one of these symbols might be
something like, n "f$verify(l)'." This would set VERIFY
"ON" and result in the user's being able to see how your
procedure works, possibly allowing location of a weak
12
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spot or a password (which should not be there in the
first place, as is noted below and in the EXIT topic
above). The inclusion of the /END option prevents the
typing of a Control-Z from causing the procedure to
branch into unintended code and possibly exiting. The
/ERROR option allows device errors and other problems to
be caught and handled (even if the method of handling the
problem is just to log off!). Check the DCL Dictionary
manual for more information on READ and its options.
SHOULD always specify version numbers on all file
specifications
This includes the specification of the captive account
procedure itself in the SYSUAF entry maintained by
AUTHORIZE. If RENAME is used to make all of the
sensitive files (those that would cause problems if they
were altered by a trespasser) version one, then specify
version one in all references. The modification of a
file will result in a version two file, which will then
be ignored. This is especially powerful in conjunction
with the use of ACL entries or alternate ownership of the
files; it prevents the captive account from deleting the
original version one file and renaming the modified one
back to version one. It helps reduce the damage in the
event that the captive account procedure is not
foolproof.
- SHOULD NEVER use "ON CONTROL_Y"
If the account is set up with the DISCTLY authorization
flag (as it should be!) there is no need for this
command. Using it opens up the possibility that the user
will type a CONTROL_Y, cause a trap to the handler
routine, and then type one again before the trap can be
reset. This will result in the procedure exiting, and a
break-in would be sustained.
- SHOULD NEVER use an embedded password (in a command
procedure)
Embedded passwords are a definite "no-no"; they never
stay secret. See the EXIT and INQUIRE commands for
alternatives and reasons not to use them.
- SHOULD NEVER allow the user access to VMS MAIL
The use of the /EDIT qualifier on the SEND or FORWARD
commands allows full file access. Once one is in the
editor, it is possible to modify any file to which the
account has access, not just the message in progress.
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The editor's INCLUDE and WRITE commands are very
dangerous! This is especially true if the captive
account has the ability to alter its own login command
procedure. The procedure can be edited to allow an exit;
the account is then reentered, the trap door used, and
the account security violated.
- SHOULD NEVER allow user access to EDT or any other editor
Never allow user access to EDT or any other editor that
allows full file access. See the MAIL restriction above
for details.
- SHOULD NEVER allow the user access to any program sending
output to a disk file
For the same reasons given under the MAIL restriction
above, never allow the user to write files with
user-selected file names.
- SHOULD NEVER evaluate a user-entered string without
checking it first
For example, the following two commands do the same
thing, but the first is NOT secure. It allows the string
"USERENTEREDB to be evaluated, resulting in the execution
of any lexical functions (such as fSverify...) that the
user happened to type in.
IF n"USERENTERED'11 .EQS. "FILES" THEN GOTO SHOWFILES
IF USERENTERED .EQS. "FILES" THEN GOTO SHOWFILES
If the ability to evaluate a user-entered string is
necessary, always check it for things like single quotes,
"f$"s, double quotes, etc., before allowing evaluation to
proceed.
SHOULD always try to eliminate multilevel command
procedures
Procedures that call other procedures are harder to
secure than ones with everything in one command file.
They increase the number of sensitive files and make it
harder to see all the code at one time. If you use
multilevel procedures, remember that error traps for each
level must be specified. Also note that all parameters
sent to the new procedure are automatically evaluated
(see the item on evaluating parameters, above).
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SHOULD always be sure to set up handling for all possible
errors
If any error occurs for which a trap has not been set up,
the procedure will exit, leaving the user at the DCL
prompt. There must be some sort of handling for ALL
errors, even if the action taken is just to log out.
Never use an OPEN, READ, etc., without specifying
/ERROR=. Always use the ON ERROR command to set up
general trapping (unless the SET NOON command is used,
which will cause errors to be ignored, except those
specified with the /ERROR= qualifiers).
SHOULD never allow a captive account to use the TECO
editor
TECO has enough capability to break out of ANY captive
command procedure.
SHOULD consider placing an alarm ACL on the most
sensitive files
Setting an alarm ACL on the most sensitive files in the
captive account can be a good way to catch people
altering them. It will at least let you know that the
file has been tampered with so that the damage can be
repaired. The command might be:
8 SET ACL CLOGIN.COM /ACL= -
$_ (ALARM=SECURITY,ACCESS-WRITE+DELETE+CONTROL+FAIL+SUCCESS)
And, on the security terminal:
$ REPLY/ENABLE=SECURITY
S SET AUDIT/ENABLE=ACL/ALARM
SHOULD consider putting the CLOGIN.COM file in a
different directory and have it owned by SYSTEM. Have
the authorization record for that account point to the
correct file and directory path. The file must be
"executable" by the captive account, however.
In authorization:
UAF> MOD captive_account/LGICMD=dir_path:[dir]CLOGIN.COM;1
o Captive Account System Considerations
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This section will cover additional things to consider while
setting up a captive account.
- SHOULD always limit the disk quota of the account
Never allow the captive account more quota than is needed
for the functions of the account. This is especially
true on disks where there are "overloaded" quotas (more
quota assigned than there is disk space).
- SHOULD always check the SYLOGIN.COM (or equivalent) for
violations of the above rules
If the system has a SYSSSYLOGIN.COM procedure, check to
be sure that it follows all of the above rules or has a
line in it similar to the following near the top of the
procedure (before any statements that violate any of the
above rules):
$ IF F$ENVIRONMENT("CAPTIVE") THEN SEXIT
The system login procedure is as much a part of captive
account security as the captive procedure itself.
SHOULD have READ only protection mask on the captive
accounts files
$ SET FILE/PROT=(0:R) [...]*.*;* <cr>
This will change the file protection to Owner:READ only
for all files owned by the captive account (in all
directories).
16
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3 SPAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES
This section will list, in brief form, all of the "Requirements" and
"Guidelines" for systems connected to SPAN. Section 3
("Implementation Techniques") will give explicit details on how to
check certain system parameters, along with how to implement the
requirements or guideline listed in this section.
3.1 System Level Requirements And Guidelines
The following requirements and guidelines pertain to overall system
security.
o SYSSANNOUNCE/SYSSWELCOME Message
WILL change the system announcement message or system
welcome message to:
- set value to "null" (blank)
set value to predescribed statement (see Section 4.1
for examples of statements to use)
o WILL delete USERLIST.LIS and NODEINFO.LIS files out of the
DECnet default directory
o SHOULD consider setting a password on the dial-up lines (this
would work for systems that have dial-up modems attached to
them)
o SHOULD consider using the "secure server" feature of VMS for
terminals (ports) on your system
o Authorizing New Accounts or Modification of Existing Accounts
SHOULD create an authorization form to request changes to
the System Authorization file and keep these forms on
file (for future reference)
o Directory and File Protection
- UIC Based Protection
Default protection should be, at minimum,
(S:RWED,0:RWED,G:RE,W)
17
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Access Control Lists (ACLs)
- Can be used to grant or deny access to a system
object. Can be placed on the following objects:
- Devices
- Files (including directory files)
Group global sections
Logical name tables
- System global sections
- Queues (with V5.0 VMS)
This manual will not go into detail on how to set up
any ACL identifiers. For complete information on how
to set these up, please refer "Guide to VAX/VMS
System Security."
3.1.1 Authorization (UAF) Security
o USER and USERP accounts WILL have a password associated with
them or WILL be deleted or WILL be DISUSERed (these are for
MicroVMS systems only)
o Accounts FIELD, SYSTEST, and SYSTEST_CLIG (if they exist)
SHOULD be DISUSERed when not in use
o The flag DISREPORT should not be used on any account
o Shared accounts SHOULD NOT be used
- SHOULD set DISRECONNECT flag for shared accounts (if
possible).
o SHOULD limit hours of use for accounts (if possible)
- DIALUP and NETWORK access are more anonymous than
directly connected terminals
18
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- DIALUP and NETWORK are easier for intruders to use to try
to break into systems
- Certain data only need to be accessible onsite
Certain users need to be supervised and do not need
access when their supervisor is not around
o User accounts SHOULD NOT fall within MAXSYSGROUP value
(usually <= 10 octal). Only system accounts should fall
within this group.
o User accounts should have no privilege beyond TMPMBX and
NETMBX (unless formerly approved by the system security
officer or by the user's supervisor).
3.1.2 VMS Accounting/Security Alarms
VMS accounting should be turned on. For systems with an X25 pad, turn
on PSI accounting. Also turn on auditing and security alarms on the
VMS system.
o VMS accounting - at a minimum log:
- DETACHED (detached job termination)
- INTERACTIVE (interactive job termination)
- LOGIN_FAILURE (login failures)
- NETWORK (network job termination)
PROCESS (any process termination)
- SUBPROCESS (subprocess termination)
o PSI accounting should be turned on
o Check/modify LGI SYSGEN parameters on the system
o Auditing and security alarms
- Security alarms should be enabled for the following:
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ACL (any access to a file with an ACL protection)
- AUDIT (any change to the current AUDIT)
- AUTHORIZATION (any modification to the current System
Authorization file SYSUAF.DAT)
- BREAKIN (any break-in from any source)
- INSTALL (any access to the INSTALL utility)
- LOGFAILURE (DIALUP,REMOTE,NETWORK)
3.2 DECnet - How To Protect It
3.2.1 DECnet Default Account
The following requirements and guidelines pertain to the DECnet
default account on a VAX/VMS system:
o In system authorization file
WILL change DECnet default password (remember to change
default password on the executor in NCP)
- WILL have no privilege beyond TMPMBX and NETMBX
- UIC WILL not fall within the MAXSYSGROUP group value
- UIC should be in a unique group
- SHOULD only allow NETWORK access
- SHOULD consider setting LOCKPWD, CAPTIVE, DISMAIL,
DISCTLY flags
- SHOULD consider setting CPU time limit
- WILL set LOGIN command to null
SHOULD consider not having a DECnet default account at
all
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3.2.2 NETSERVER.LOGs
o SHOULD edit NETSERVER.COM (NOTE: Not supported by DEC) to
stop automatic purging of NETSERVER.LOGs
o SHOULD protect NETSERVER.LOG files (S:RWD,0,G,W)
o SHOULD modify NETSERVERSTIMEOUT (length of time "server"
processes live after object termination)
o SHOULD, use FALSLOG to enhance audits
3.2.3 DECnet Objects
3.2.3.1 Task Object 0 -
o WILL protect or remove Task Object 0 from the DECnet data
base by one of the following methods:
Remove it completely from the DECnet data base
Specify an invalid username for the Task Object (allow
you to control access to the Task Object) in the
permanent data base.
Move it to a protected directory and require system staff
help to access and use it. This does not prevent use of
Task Object 0 once it is set up, but at least system
staff will know who or what is using Task Object 0.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES
The following sections will give the additional detail needed to
implement the SPAN Security Requirements and Guidelines. Where
applicable, detailed steps will be given.
4.1 System-Level Guidelines
o SYSSANNOUNCE/SYSSWELCOME Message
All node managers on SPAN WILL change their system
announcement message (message that is displayed before the
username prompt) to one of the following:
- Set value of SYSSANNOUNCE to null (blank)
S ASSIGN/SYSTEM SYSSANNOUNCE " "
Be sure to have this line in your system startup file
SYSTARTUP.COM (or SYSTARTUPJV5.COM on V5.x systems) so
that each time the system reboots this message is
displayed.
- To set value of SYSSANNOUNCE, do the following:
$ ASSIGN/SYSTEM SYSSANNOUNCE ANNOUNCE.TXT
In the file ANNOUNCE.TXT, have it say:
ANY UNAUTHORIZED ATTEMPT TO ACCESS THIS SYSTEM IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE
or
*WARNING* *WARNING * *WARNING* *WARNING * *WARNING * *WARNING* *WARNING
* *
* This computer is operated by/for the U.S. Government. *
* Unauthorized access to and/or use of this computer system *
* is a violation of law and punishable under the provisions *
* of 18 USC 1029, 18 USC 1030, and other applicable statutes. *
*
*WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING*
or
You are connected to a U.S. Government computer system. Any
unauthorized ATTEMPT to gain access to this system may be
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.
Pftfr ZQ INTENTIONALLY BUNK ™ PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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If a computer system does not have a SYSSANNOUNCE message, then the
SYSSWELCOME (banner displayed after successfully logging in) should be
modified to include the above statement. To do this, do the
following:
o Set value of SYSSWELCOME
$ ASSIGN/SYSTEM SYSSWELCOME WELCOME.TXT
Have the file WELCOME.TXT include one of the above examples.
o WILL delete USERLIST.LIS and NODEINFO.LIS files
Several earlier versions of the SPAN documentation set have
advocated the use of the files USERLIST.LIS and NODEINFO.LIS.
The USERLIST.LIS file was to contain a listing of all users
on the system and their usernames. The NODEINFO.LIS file was
to contain pertinent information about the computer, such as
system manager name, network address and phone number, VMS
version running on the system, type of VMS system, etc.
These files, as stated in earlier documentation, were to be
kept in the DECnet default directory for use by other
colleagues in the SPAN community to help them locate other
researchers.
Because of the increase in unauthorized access attempts on
systems on SPAN, it has been determined that the files
USERLIST.LIS and NODEINFO.LIS WILL be deleted from all SPAN
nodes. These files make it easier for an unauthorized user
to try valid usernames to break into a computer.
NODEINFO.LIS can be used to attack a system running a
particular version of VMS, especially one with known holes.
o SHOULD consider setting a password on the dial-up lines (this
would work for systems that have dial-up modems attached to
them)
If a computer system has dial-up modems attached to it, it is
a good idea to set a system password for these lines. The
steps are as follows:
Invoke AUTHORIZE and set up the system password
UAF> ADD/SYSTEM_PASSWORD = xxxxxxxx
Modify the terminal set-up file for those lines that
coorespond to the dial-up modems
$ SET TERM xxxx: /SYSPWD/PERMANENT
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o SHOULD consider using the "secure server" feature of VMS for
terminals (ports) on the system
The "secure server" feature of VMS ensures that users can
only log into terminals (ports) that are already logged out.
It requires the user to press the BREAK key on a terminal,
and the secure server, if enabled, responds by first
disconnecting any logged in process. The purpose of the
secure server is to ensure that the VAX/VMS login program is
the ONLY program able to receive the login. This prevents
just about all possibilities of a user logging into a program
that mimics the login sequence. These programs, typically,
steal passwords. To use the secure server, do the following:
Modify the terminal set-up file for those lines that
correspond to your dial-up modems
$ SET TERM xxxx: /SECURE/DISCONNECT/PERMANENT
Be sure to modify the appropriate file that is invoked by
SYSTARTUP.COM [SYSTARTUP_V5.COM under VMS V5.x] so that
the terminal characteristics will remain the same after
reboot.
This feature is documented in greater detail in the "Guide to
VAX/VMS System Security" written by Digital Equipment
Corporation.
o Authorizing New Accounts
An accounting authorization form should be used to request
additions, changes, and deletion of user accounts on a
computer system. This form, if not already in existence,
should contain the following information (at a minimum):
1. Full name, address, and phone number for the account
owner
2. Disk and quota specifications
3. Privileges, besides the normal TMPMBX,NETMBX, that are
required
4. Expiration date for the account
There should be in effect an account authorization mechanism
whereby the . system manager and whomever that person is
accountable to has signed off. The form should have a spot
that clearly states that the user has received a security
briefing from the system security officer. It also should
state that the user understands the responsibilty for
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computer security,
o Directory and File Protection
- UIC based protection
The following SYSGEN parameter will show the default VMS
protection.
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SHO RMS_FILEPROT <cr>
Parameter Name Current Default Minimum Maximum Unit Dynamic
RMS_FILEPROT 64000 64000 0 65535 Prot-mask
SYSGEN> EXIT <cr>
The protection is expressed as a mask. By default, the mask
is 64000 (decimal) or FAOO (hexidecimal), which represents
the protection (S:RWED,0:RWED,G:RE,W).
To change the VMS default protection on the system, the
system manager should add the following line to the
SYLOGIN.COM (every user account invokes this system-wide
login command procedure upon login to your system).
S SET PROTECTION^ :RWED,0:RWED,G,W)/DEFAULT
If users on the system want to change the normal file
protection for files that they create, they will have to
change the protection after creation of the file or add the
appropriate SET PROTECTION line to their personal login
command procedure.
Normal sequence of events VMS does to determine
accessibility of a file
When someone is trying to access a file on the system,
VMS goes through the following sequence to validate
access to that file:
If the file has an ACL identifier:
If the ACL grants access, then access is given
- If the ACL denies access, then use SYSTEM and
OWNER fields of the UlC-based protection
- If the ACL does not explicitly grant or deny
access, then use the UlC-based protection
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If the file has no ACL identifier:
Use the UlC-based protection mask
- If the user has BYPASS, READALL, SYSPRV, or GRPPRV
privileges, then VMS allows the appropriate access to
the file
- UIC-Based Protection
Files have an ownership UIC and a protection mask.
The default protection mask for most systems is
(S:RWED,0:RWED,G:RE,W). This means:
- SYSTEM - S:RWED
- System - READ, WRITE, EXECUTE, and DELETE
access to the file. System (S) constitutes:
- User's UIC group number <= MAXSYSGROUP
- User has SYSPRIV privilege
- User has GRPPRV privilege and the user's
UIC group number is equal to the file's
UIC group number
- User's UIC is equal to the file's UIC
group
- OWNER - 0:RWED
- Owner - READ, WRITE, EXECUTE, and DELETE
access to the file. Owner (0) constitutes:
User's UIC group and member number matches
the file's UIC group and member number
- GROUP - G:RE
- Group - READ and EXECUTE access to the file.
Group (G) constitutes:
User's UIC group number matches the file's
group number
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WORLD - W
World - no access
Any user not in the system, owner, or group
category on the system. Includes all users
on the network.
To show the current protection mask of a file, do the
following:
$ DIR/PROT filename.ext
Directory: directory_path: [username]
filename.ext;version_# (S:RWED,0:RWED,G:R,W)
or
$ DIR/SEC filename.ext
Directory: directory_path:[username]
filename, ext; version_# [Username] (S.-RWED, 0:RWED,G:R,W)
To change the current protection mask of a file, the
user would do the following:
S SET FILE/PROT=(W:RWED) filename.ext
We discourage all users of .a computer system from
allowing world access to their files. With the
protection set to W:RWED, anyone on the system or on
the network is allowed to READ, WRITE, EXECUTE, and
DELETE these files.
ACL-Based Protection
Please refer to the Digital Equipment Corporation's
"Guide to VAX/VMS Security" for details on how to use
ACL identifiers. NOTE: There will be an increase in
the system overhead when accessing files. ACLs are
not easy to maintain and you might cause problems
when using BACKUP and ACL recovery. It may be
preferred to set these up only on system-critical
files.
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4.1.1 Authorization (UAF) Security
The system manager should also consider the following for account
security:
o USER and USERP accounts WILL have a password associated with
them or WILL be deleted or WILL be DISUSERed (these are for
MicroVMS systems only)
To check the status of the USER and USERP accounts on the
system, do the following in AUTHORIZE,
UAF> SHO USER <cr>
which will result in the display of either the UAF record or
the error message %UAF-W-BADSPC, no user-matched
specification (which means that this account does not exist
on the system).
To set a password on this account, do the following:
UAF> MOD user/PASSWORD=xxxxxxxx <cr>
(where xxxxxxxx is the desired password).
To delete this account from the system, do the following:
UAP> REMOVE user <cr>
To DISUSER this account, do the following:
UAF> MOD user/FLAG=DISUSER <cr>
The account USERP can be substituted for USER; the commands
are the same. Do not forget to delete the directory and
files that are owned by these accounts.
o The accounts FIELD, SYSTEST, and SYSTEST_CLIG (if in
existence) should be set to DISUSER when not in use
UAF> MOD field/FLAG=DISUSER <cr>
SHOULD consider modifying the system's midnight or daily
system command procedure (if in existence) to
automatically DISUSER the accounts FIELD, SYSTEST, and
SYSTEST CLIG
29
IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES
o The flag DISREPORT SHOULD NOT be used on any account
o Shared accounts SHOULD NOT be used, but if necessary:
- Shared accounts should have the DISRECONNECT flag set
UAF> MOD shared_account/FLAG=DISCONNECT <cr>
o If an account has no legitimate uses outside certain hours or
requires only specific restricting access methods and/or
hours
- Consider setting the following in AUTHORZE
- /NONETWORK - the user cannot log in from the network
(could be appropriate for the OPERATOR account or
FIELD account)
- /NOREMOTE - the user cannot log in remotely
- /NODIALUP - the user cannot use the dial-in modems to
access the system
- /NOBATCH - the user cannot run batch jobs on your
system (good for student accounts that do not need
BATCH capability)
/PRIMEDAYS - only allow access to the system on
particular days
An example would be a user account called PENNY (whose
owner Copper Penny never works on weekends). Set the
account to only allow access Monday-Friday. Command
would be
UAF> MOD penny/PRIMEDAYS=(NOSAT,NOSUN) <cr>
where the account is not allowed access on Saturdays or
Sundays
or
UAF> MOD
 Penny/PRIMEDAYS=(MON)TUE,WED)THU,FRI) <cr>
where the account is only allowed access Monday through
Friday.
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o User accounts should not fall within the MAXSYSGROUP group
value
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SHQ MAXSYSGROUP <cr>
Parameter Name Current Default Minimum Maximum Unit Dynamic
MAXSYSGROUP 8 8 1 32768 UIC Group D
SYSGEN> EXIT <cr>
This will show the current settings for the system.
The default parameter value says that any account that has
the UIC group between 0 and 10 will automatically get full system
privileges. As an example:
$ SD SYSSSYSTEM <cr>
$ RUN AUTHORIZE <cr>
UAF> SHOW/BRIEF [1,*] <cr>
Owner Username UIC Account Privs Pri Directory
System Manager SYSTEM [1,4] SYSTEM All 4 SYSSSYSROOT:[SYSMGR]
Field Service FIELD [1,3] SYSTEM All 4 SYSSSYSROOT:[SYSMAINT]
UAF> EXIT
Make sure that only system-type accounts (SYSTEM, FIELD) fall
within this group.
o User accounts should have no privilege beyond TMPMBX and
NETMBX
4.1.2 VMS Accounting/Security Alarms
o VMS Accounting
The following line should appear somewhere in the system
startup file (SYSTARTUP.COM):
$ SET ACCOUNTING/ENABLED(DETAC,INTER.LOGIN,NET,PROC,SUBP)
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o PSI accounting SHOULD be turned on
If the PSI software is being used, its accounting should be
enabled to track X.25/X.29 calls. Somewhere in the system
startup file, the following line should appear:
$ 6SYS$MANAGER:PSIACCOUNTING ON
o Check/modify SYSGEN LGI parameters on the system
To check the SYSGEN LGI parameters on the system, do the
following:
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SHO/LGI <cr>
Parameters in use: Active
Parameter Name Current Default Minimum Maximum Unit Dynamic
LGI BRK TERM
LGI BRK DISUSER
LGI PWD TMO
LGI RETRY LIM
LGI RETRY TMO
LGI BRK LIM
LGI BRK TMO
LGI HID TIM
0
0
30
3
20
5
960
300
1
0
30
3
20
5
300
300
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 Boolean
1 Boolean
255 Seconds
255 Tries
255 Seconds
255 Failures
-1 Seconds
-1 Seconds
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
SYSGEN> EXIT
Several of these parameters determine WHEN break-in and
evasion take place on the system. It is a good idea to
change the default settings so that break-in and evasion kick
off earlier than the default. SYSGEN LGI parameters are
dynamic, so any change will take immediate effect on the
system. Remember, though, to add the modified LGI parameters
to the MODPARAMS.DAT file (located in the SYSSSYSTEM
directory) so that the next time that AUTOGEN and reboot are
run, the tightened LGI parameters will still be in effect.
This document will only cover those LGI parameters we feel
should be changed from their default settings. For
additional information on LGI parameters, please see the
"VAX/VMS Utilities Reference Volume" and the "Guide to
VAX/VMS System Security" manuals.
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- LGI_BRK_TERM - default setting for this parameter is 1.
If the system parameter is 1, a user can attempt to log
onto the system and fail several times until it trips
break-in/evasion, but only from THAT terminal. A user
can simply go to another terminal (or start another LAT
session) and try all over again. If this parameter is
turned off (set value to 0), log failures are tracked by
username across ALL terminal types. To change the
default setting, do the following:
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SET LGI_BRK_TERM 0 <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE ACTIVE <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE CURRENT <cr>
SYSGEN> EXIT <cr>
LGI_BRK_TMO - this is the average number of minutes
allowed between login failures (e.g., default setting is
300 seconds or 5 minutes). This means that the system
will not notice login failures that occur to accounts
every 5 minutes. To change this default setting, do the
following:
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SET LGI_BRK_TMO 960 <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE ACTIVE <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE CURRENT <cr>
SYSGEN> EXIT <cr>
- LGI_BRK_LIM - number of tries before break-in is
detected. This parameter, along with LGI_HID_TMO,
determines when the system decides that there is a
break-in attempt in progress. If you have noisey dialup
lines or thumb-fingered users, a LGI_BRK_LIM less than 3
could inadvertently lock out legitimate users. To change
the default setting, do the following:
$ MCR SYSGEN <cr>
SYSGEN> SET LGI_BRK_LIM 3 <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE ACTIVE <cr>
SYSGEN> WRITE CURRENT <cr>
SYSGEN> EXIT <cr>
- LGI_HID_TIM (random number between 1 and 1.5 seconds)
the duration for the evasive action is influenced by the
LGI_HID_TIM parameter value. This helps to obscure the
true evasion time.
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o Auditing and Security Alarms
Security alarms are messages that are sent to the security
operator's terminal when specific events take place. For the
system security manager, these alarms assist in maintaining
an acceptable level of security. They can help in detecting
break-in attempts to the system and users doing undesirable
things to the system.
The VAX/VMS system allows several types of alarms to be
turned on. The following events can be audited:
ACL (any access to a file with an ACL protection)
One can audit successful or unsuccessful access to a file.
To do so, add an ALARM_JOURNAL ACE to a file's ACL table.
See the ACL section in this manual
Then enable the ACL alarms. The syntax is
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=ACL
- AUDIT (any change to the current AUDIT)
One can enable auditing for execution of the SET AUDIT
command. The syntax is:
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=AUDIT
- AUTHORIZATION (any modification to the current system
authorization file SYSUAF.DAT)
Changes to system authorization data base
One can audit changes made to the system or network UAF
data base. The types of changes that can be audited are:
- adding a system UAF record (a new user)
- deleting a system UAF record (delete a user)
- changing a system UAF record (change a user record)
- copying a system UAF record (a new user)
- renaming a system UAF record
- adding a network UAF record
- deleting a network UAF record
- modifying a network UAF record
The syntax is:
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=AUTHORIZATION
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Example of an alarm:
%%%%%%%%%%% OPCOM 10-MAY-1989 09:48:04.43
Security alarm on NSSDCA / Identifier added
Time: 10-MAY-1989 09:48:04.42
PID: 00000000
User Name: SYSTEM
Image: HSCSDUAO:[SYSO.SYSCOMMON.][SYSEXE]AUTHORIZE.EXE
ID name: new_user_id
ID value: [999,99]
Id attributes: (None)
Changes to rights data base
One can audit changes made to the rights data base. The
types of change that can be audited are:
- creation of a new rights data base
- addition of an identifier
- removal of an identifier
- granting of an identifier to a holder
- revoking of an identifier from a holder
- modification of a holder
The syntax is:
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=AUTHORIZATION
BREAKIN (any break-in from any source)
INSTALL (any access to the INSTALL utility)
LOGFAILURE (DIALUP,REMOTE,NETWORK)
File_Access - selected types of access to files and
global sections. An example would be:
Turn on the alarm:
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=(FILE_ACCESS=(BYPASS:DELETE,-
SYSPRV:DELETE))
Example of output in OPERATOR.LOG:
%%%%%%%%%%% OPCOM ll-MAY-1989 00:00:28.08 %%%%%%%%%%%
Security alarm on NSSDCA / Successful file access
Time: ll-MAY-1989 00:00:28.07
PID: 00000000
User Name: username
Image: system_disk:[SYSEXE]DELETE.EXE
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File: diskname: [user_directory]filename.ext
Mode: DELETE
Privs Used: SYSPRV
One might want to set up a specific terminal or port on
the system to have all alarms sent to it. One could add
something like the following to the SYSTARTUP.COM:
$ DEFINE/USER SYSSCOMMAND Txxx:
S REPLY/ENABLE=SECURITY
$ SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=(ACL,AUDIT,AUTHORIZATION.INSTALL,•
BREAKIN=(DIALUP,NETWORK,REMOTE),-
LOGFAIL=(DIALUP,NETWORK,REMOTE)
Or, one could turn on all components of the BREAKIN and
LOGFAIL detection (no matter what the source) by doing
the following:
$ DEFINE/USER SYSSCOMMAND Txxx:
$ REPLY/ENABLE=SECURITY
S SET AUDIT/ALARM/ENABLE=(ACL,AUDIT,AUTHORIZATION,INSTALL, -
BREAKIN=(ALL),LOGFAIL=(ALL)
One could also have this type of information going to the
system console port. To do this, add the following to
SYSTARTUP.COM:
$ DEFINE/USER SYSSCOMMAND OPAO:
S REPLY/DISABLE=SECURITY
Remember that once a user trips the break-in alarm, the
incorrect passwords are printed in the security log file.
It may be relatively easy to spme unauthorized person to
"guess" at a user's correct password from seeing the
incorrect password displayed on the console. For this
reason, it is a good idea NOT to print security log
messages to the system console port (OPAO:).
ACL - event request by an ACL on a file or global section
4.2 DECnet - How To Protect It
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4.2.1 DECnet Default Account
o In system authorization file
WILL change DECnet default password
The DECnet default account permits certain types of
access to your system from remote nodes without requiring
them to specify the account and password information
(i.e., access control string). Instead, this information
is supplied in the DECnet executor and object data bases.
When installing DECnet on a VAX/VMS system, the default
settings for the DECnet account and network objects are:
Username: DECnet
Password: DECnet
This allows the following:
Any remote user can access files on the system based
on the world protection mask (W:RWED) of that file
- Any remote user can, with a little ingenuity, run
programs or command procedures on the system via the
DECnet account
If the default password is being used for the DECnet
account (password is DECnet), change it. Someone can use
the explicit access control string "DECnet DECnet" to run
a remote job on the system. To change the password, do
the following:
Run authorize and change the default account password
UAF> MOD DECNET/PASSWORD=xxxxxxxx
where DECNET=default account name,
changed already.
This may have been
Change password that is referenced by the DECnet object
data base (Note: BYPASS and CMKRNL privileges required)
$ RUN SYS$SYSTEM:NCP
NCP> SHO EXEC CHAR
NCP> MOD EXEC NONPRIV PASSWORD xxxxxxxx
NCP> SHO KNOW OBJ
(any object that has a DECnet password associated with it
must show the new password)
NCP> SET OBJECT FAL USER DECNET PASSWORD xxxxxxxx
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If the password in the DECnet object data base does not match
the password in the SYSUAF record, then a "login information
invalid" error will be generated. Any network access
requests for the DECnet object will fail.
o The DECnet account WILL have no privileges beyond TMPMBX and
NETMBX
Under NO circumstances should the default account be given
more than the above privileges. DECnet only requires the
above privileges to work; giving this account extra
privileges is of little use and could be a large security
problem.
o UIC WILL NOT fall within the MAXSYSGROUP group value
See previous instructions under Authorization (UAF) Security
on how to check this value to make sure this account does not
fall within the MAXSYSGROUP group value.
o UIC should be in a unique group
o SHOULD have only NETWORK access in authorization:
In authorization:
UAF> MOD DECNET/NETWORK/NODIALUP/NOREMOTE/NOBATCH/NOINTERACTIVE
o SHOULD consider setting LOCKPWD, CAPTIVE, DISMAIL, and
DISCTLY flags in AUTHORIZE
In authorization:
UAF> MOD DECNET/FLAGS=(LOCKPWD,CAPTIVE,DISMAIL,DISCTLY)
LOCKPWD locks the password and prevents network users from
changing it. Setting CAPTIVE and DISCTLY prevents network
users from misusing the account. DISMAIL stops people from
sending mail using this account.
o SHOULD consider setting a CPU time limit on this account
Prevents long network jobs from executing. Usually network
jobs should take no longer than a few seconds. In
authorization:
UAF> MOD DECNET/CPU=00:01: DC-
Putting a CPU limit on the DECnet default account may cause
problems if a lot of people copy large files to and from the
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system. Please keep this in mind when choosing to use this
option.
o WILL set the LOGIN command to the null device
In authorization:
UAF> MOD DECNET/LGICMD=NL: <cr>
Prevents network users from copying a LOGIN.COM into the
default account and having it execute.
o WILL set the PRCLM value in the UAF record to 1.
Prevents remote users from executing the SPAWN command,
o SHOULD consider not having a DECnet default account at all
In authorization:
UAF> REMOVE DECNET <cr>
4.2.2 NETSERVER.LOGs
o SHOULD edit NETSERVER.COM (NOTE: Not supported by DEC) to
stop the automatic purging of NETSERVER.LOGs. To do this:
$ SET DBF SYSSSYSTEM <cr>
$ EDIT NETSERVER.COM
Comment out the following lines:
$! IF PERMANENT_NETSERVER_COUNTER .LT. 25 THEN GOTO LOOP
and
S! IF FSSEARCH ("SYSSLOGIN:NETSERVER.LOG;-10") .NES. nn THEN
$! PURGE/KEEP:3 SYSSLOGIN:NETSERVER.LOG
This will stop the automatic purge of the NETSERVER.LOG
files. The command procedure NETSERVER.COM is invoked each
time a new server process starts up (e.g., incoming network
connection for a DECnet object). Remember: The next time
the system software is upgraded, it will be necessary to
modify the command procedure NETSERVER.COM for this to stay
in effect.
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o SHOULD protect NETSERVER.LOG files
This will protect the NETSERVER.LOG files contained in the
DECnet default directory from unauthorized browsing or
deleting. It also makes it impossible for a hacker to
completely cover the tracks.
- Suggest (S:RWED,0,G,W)
o SHOULD modify NETSERVERSTIMEOUT (length of time server
processes live after object termination)
This makes each network connection create its own
NETSERVER.LOG instead of having multiple object accesses in
one NETSERVER.LOG file. It also forces a VMS accounting
record for EACH network access.
To set this value to 10 seconds, do the following:
$ DEFINE/SYSTEM/EXEC NETSERVERSTIMEOUT "000 00:00:10"
NOTE: This will cause some additional processes to be
created on the system and might cause system
degradations.
- SHOULD use FALSLOG to enhance audits
$ DEFINE/SYSTEM/EXEC /FALSLOG "1"
This is an UNDOCUMENTED feature in VMS. It inserts
extended information into the NETSERVER.LOG file. The
possible bit-mask definitions are:
o Bit-mask (best defined as a character string):
- Bit 0 - enables logging of filename(s)
- Bit 1 - enables generation of throughput
statistics
- Bit 2 - enables logging of DAP messages
- Bit 3 - enables logging of XMIT and RECV AST
completions
- Bit 4 - enables logging of XMIT and RECV QIO
requests
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Bit 5 - reserved
Bit 6 - disables DAP message blocking
- Bit 7 - disables DAP CRC error checking
- Bit 8-31 - reserved
NOTE: By appending the string "/DISABLE=8" to the
end of the definition you can disable "poor-man's
routing" from being used on your node.
$ DEFINE/SYSTEM/EXEC FALSLOG "1/DISABLE=8"
4.2.3 DECnet Objects
4.2.3.1 TASK Object 0 -
The TASK object (i.e., Object 0) is created during system
startup by the STARTNET.COM command procedure. The TASK
object may be used by unauthorized users to run a program
under the DECnet default account on a given system
remotely and interactively. Unauthorized users have
access to the system's facilities without knowing a
username and password and with no accountability. There
are many methods to avoid a possible security problem
associated with the use of the TASK Object. Two are
presented below.
o Remove the TASK object
Remove the TASK object from the volatile DECnet data
base by doing the following:
$ RUN SYS$SYSTEM:NCP <cr>
NCP> CLEAR OBJECT TASK ALL <cr>
NCP> EXIT <cr>
In addition, because the TASK object gets defined
every time the system is rebooted, add the following
commands to the system-specific startup command
procedure (also known as SYSTARTUP.COM or
SYSTARTUP_V5.COM under VMS V5.x) after the execution
of the STARTNET command procedure:
S eSYSSMANAGER:STARTNET.COM
$ RUN SYS$SYSTEM:NCP <cr>
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CLEAR OBJET TASK ALL <cr>
EXIT <cr>
o Specify an invalid username for the TASK object
(control access to the TASK object)
One can set an invalid default account for the TASK
object in the network object data base. The
following are used to do this:
$ RUN SYS$SYSTEM:NCP <cr>
NCP> DEFINE OBJECT TASK NUMBER 0 USER invalid_user -
PASSWORD invalid_password <cr>
NCP> SET OBJECT TASK NUMBER 0 USER invalid_user -
PASSWORD invalid_password <cr>
NCP> EXIT <cr>
An invalid username and password are specified so
that the default access on inbound connects to this
object (e.g., unauthorized users) will be
unsuccessful.
NOTE: By specifying a valid userid but an invalid
password, a login failure record will be generated
which will alert you to the unauthorized attempt to
use the TASK object.
Authorized users can connect to the TASK object;
however, an access control string is required:
$ 8NODE"valid_username valid_passwordn::"Deprocedure
NOTE: Both of these methods will search for the
specified procedure in the home directory of the user
specified in the access string or proxy.
One can then allow proxy access to the task
object
Add the authorized users to the proxy data base
by doing the following:
S RUN SYSSSYSTEM:AUTHORIZE <cr>
UAF> ADD/PROXY NODE::authorized_username valid_username
UAF> EXIT <cr>
Authorized users connect to the task object via:
$ 8NODE::"Deprocedure"
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5 DETECTING/REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS
This section deals with how to determine if security violations have
occurred on the system.
5.1 Detecting Security Incidents
Security incidents can be very hard to detect, especially for
successful attempts at accessing the system. Systems managers,
however, can gain insight by close daily monitoring of their systems.
In particular, they should pay close attention to the following:
o User accounts
Someone logged in during a time that is not normal
Several login sessions, at once, to a particular account
o Unexplained change in the system load. To check to see who
is using the system resources, do the following:
$ MONITOR/PROCESSES/TOPCPU
o Unfamiliar files in:
DECnet default account (there are NO required files in
this directory)
- SYSSSYSTEM
- SYSSMANAGER
o Access to ACL protected files
o Unexplained alarms in the OPERATOR.LOG file
o Unaccountable changes to the system authorization file
(SYSUAF.DAT)
o Excessive login failures and intrusion invasions. To check
this, do the following:
$ SHO INTRU <cr>
Intrusion Type Count Expiration Source
TERMINAL SUSPECT 5 15:32:23.58
NETWORK SUSPECT 1 14:49:00.47 host::username
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NETWORK INTRUDER 7 14:58:10.70 host::username
o Unfamiliar images running on the system. To check this, do
the following:
$ SHO SYSTEM <cr>
o Installation of any privileged image
o Unexplained Disk and other system errors
Users of the system can be a good source for detecting security
problems. Here are some indications for which they should be on the
alert:
o Login messages should be read, especially the following:
Last interactive login
- Last noninteractive login
Login failure message (e.g., three failures since last
successful login)
Disconnect job message for a process the user never
started
o File changes, such as:
- Missing or renamed files
- Files not owned by the user's account. To check this, a
user would do the following:
$ DIR/SECURITY
Directory DISK:[user_directory]
FILENAME.EXT [user_directory] (RWED,RWED,RE,)
ANOTHERFILE.EXT [smith] (RWED,RWED,RE,)
This means the file ANOTHERFILE.EXT is owned by Smith and
not by the owner of the directory.
Unexplained changes in file protection or ownership of
the user files
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o Disk quota is exceeded and the user was not responsible
Educating the user community will help the system manager maintain an
acceptable level of security on the system.
5.2 Reporting Security Incidents
All suspected security incidents should be reported to the SPAN
security manager. When reporting a problem, please be sure to include
the following information:
o All related accounting and PSI accounting records
o All related NETSERVER.LOGs
o All related OPERATOR.LOGs
Send the report via electronic mail to NCF::NETMGR. This account is
monitored by several individuals in the SPAN Network Office at the
Goddard Space Flight Center. The SPAN security manager is alerted to
all security incidents reported via this account.
After an investigation is made into the incident, a. formal incident
report will be filed if the incident is determined to be a security
problem. One will find that the majority of the incidents reported
end up being legitimate users of the network who make mistakes. These
are usually cleared up quickly and no incident report is written.
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6 SPAN SECURITY TOOLKIT
6.1 Introduction
With the growth of networks, system security has recently taken on a
new importance. The increased exposure of a networked system must be
compensated by an increased attention to system integrity. The
intention to monitor a system more closely, or to reduce exposure, is
good but will prove very difficult without appropriate tools.
VMS supplies many useful security features, but all of these take time
to monitor and most system managers do not have the time available.
We have found this to be the case at the National Space Science Data
Center (NSSDC), Goddard Space Flight Center. Rather than giving up
the idea of a secure system, we have tried to invent some tools to
reduce the work involved in tracking the system's vulnerabilities.
There are no claims that these solutions are perfect, or even ideal.
Many can, and probably will, be improved in the future. Some were
written at NSSDC by the system management staff for use on their own
system, and some were acquired from DECUS tapes or from other system
managers. All have evolved and been improved with the experience
gained in using them, and they will continue to evolve as new ideas
are suggested or new threats appear. Based on the many requests for
these programs, it was decided that they should be collected into a
"toolkit," documented, and modified to improve portability to other
systems. In this way, we can answer the requests for help without
being swamped in the process.
It is highly recommended that the "Guide to VAX/VMS System Security"
that comes with VMS is read. There are a number of features of VMS
that can contribute significantly to system security. Many of them
are only mentioned in passing in the various .DOC files in toolkit.
Reading the VMS documentation, especially the system security the
manual, is the only way to learn about everything that is available
and that should be avoided or monitored. The toolkit is intended to
aid in maintaining a secure system. It cannot take the place of a
good understanding of the system or eliminate all of the effort
needed.
It is also very likely that other programs, or better variations of
the ones we have in the toolkit now, have already been developed for
your system. If this is the case, and it is allowable for these
programs to be distributed as part of future toolkits, we would
appreciate hearing about them. If you have similar programs that are
not allowed to be distributed, we would still be interested in hearing
about the features these programs have so that we can possibly include
similar features in the toolkit.
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We expect at least one more release of the toolkit. There may be more
in the future, but this will depend on the nature of the new
capabilities and how useful they turn out to be.
We hope that this collection will prove useful. If there are any
suggestions for improving the toolkit as a whole or any program
contained in it, or other useful programs that are not included here,
please let us know. Contact us on SPAN at: NCF::SUPPORT or by the
phone at (301) 286-9794.
6.2 Why Was It Created?
We at SPAN have always stated that the only way to have a secure
network is to secure each host" attached to the network. During the
last Data Systems Users Working Group (DSUWG) meeting, September 1988
in Anaheim, California, several dozen SPAN node managers asked SPAN
management to develop a set of system security tools that would help
them in their day-to-day system management functions. A presentation
on the types of tools being used at the NSSDC system facility helped
the group decide on the basic set to use for the SPAN Security
toolkit.
Recent unauthorized access incidents have indicated that VAX/VMS
systems on SPAN are vulnerable to attacks. We at SPAN want to lessen
the possibility of a system being penetrated. Also, the Computer
Security Act of 1987 requires computer systems operated by the
government or for the government to be protected against unlawful
access.
6.3 Contents Of The Toolkit
The Security Toolkit consists of a number of programs, text files,
command procedures, and data files. They may be used together, or
selected systems may be implemented and the rest ignored, as seems
appropriate for the situation.
The kit is organized into a single directory tree. The overall
structure of this tree is shown in the following figure. Logical
names for the directories (as defined in SECURITY LOGICALS.COM)
appear on the right. The logical names that start with "SECURITYS"
are normal logical names used to refer to the given directory. The
names beginning with "SECS" are rooted logical names and are used when
referring to subdirectories of the given directory.
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[KIT] SECURITYSDIR
SECSDIR:
—[CHECK_FILES] SECURITYSCHECK_FILES| SEC$CHECK_FILES
+ [SOURCE]
+ — [TAP] SECURITYSTAP
| SECSTAP
+ [SOURCE]
+ — [SECLOG] i SECURITYSSECLOG
| SECSSECLOG
+ [SOURCE]
+ [LOGS]
+— [UTILITIES] SECURITYSUTIL| SECSUTIL
I
+ [SOURCE]
+ — [DOCUMENTS] SECURITYSDOC| | SECSDOC
I I
I '+ [SOURCE]
+ — [VERB] SECURITYSVERB| | SECSVERB
| + [SOURCE]
The contents of these directories (in terms of programs/systems) are:
o Top level directories, logical name and symbol definition
files, security distribution list for use with VMS Mail, an
AAAREADME.1ST file that directs the user to this document
o The CHECK FILES system runtime files: decommented .COM
files, data files, documentation, and temporary files.
CHECK FILES is used to check for alterations to a list of
specified files. If changes are found, a mail message is
sent to notify the appropriate people about it.
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Commented versions of the .COM files (.SRC extensions),
RUNOFF source for the DOC file, and a build procedure
TAP runtime, documentation, startup, and dictionary files.
TAP is used to check passwords of accounts for security. If
TAP can guess the password, then any determined person can do
the same. It also comes with a sample message to send to the
users whose passwords are guessed. The message contains some
rules for picking secure passwords.
- C source code for TAP, RUNOFF input for the .DOC and
USER.MESSAGE files, and a build procedure
Runtime procedures and documentation for the security alarm
extractor. This makes checking the security alarms that are
written to the OPERATOR.LOG file almost painless. It also
allows the work to be distributed to several people.
Commented source code for the command procedures, input
to RUNOFF for the .DOC file, and a build procedure.
- SECURITY.LOG files from runs. These contain the
extracted alarm messages. This directory is empty until
SECLOG SCAN is run.
Miscellaneous utility programs and the documentation for
them. Many are used by other parts of the kit, but some are
intended for use on their own. See the .DOC files in the
SECURITYSUTIL directory for more details. The programs are:
- CRC - calculates a CHECKSUM for a file. Used by
CHECK_FILES.
DECOMM - removes comments from DCL command procedures to
speed execution. It also allows inclusion of debug
lines. This is used by most of the build procedures in
the kit.
- CHECK LOGICALS - verifies that all security kit logical
names have been defined and are from the correct version
of the kit. This is used by most command procedures in
the kit.
- PRIV CHECK - allows easy identification of accounts with
high login failure counts, various combinations of
privileges, or accounts that have been DISUSERed. It is
used by system managers and not by other parts of the
kit.
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SAFETERM - is used to lock a terminal session to prevent
access when the terminal must be left unattended. It
allows anyone to log the process off to free the terminal
for use by another user, but it requires a password to
gain access to the original process. Help with commands
for the program is built in. This is not used by any
part of the kit; it is intended for system managers and
users. It may be run from the SECURITYSUTIL directory or
moved to wherever public utilities are kept. Note that
if users are allowed to run it from the SECURITYSUTIL
directory, set the protection to allow access. As
shipped, all files in the directory are protected against
WORLD and GROUP access.
Commented source for all utilities. Build procedures and
associated files where appropriate. Utilities involving
more than one file are each in a separate subdirectory.
o Documentation:
Captive account dos and don'ts, documents for the toolkit
as a whole
RUNOFF source for the .DOC files and a build procedure to
run them off and to move and rename the RUNOFF output.
o VERB - program for listing DCLTABLES.EXE definitions;
VERB.CLD to define the VERB command, VERB.HLP to build a help
library entry for VERB, and VERB.DOC to describe the program
and its use. It also includes VERB__CHECK.COM, -which allows
an automated comparison of DCLTABLES.EXE against previously
compiled records of its contents.
o Source code files for VERB, commented version of
VERB_CHECK.COM, build procedure to regenerate VERB
There are several things that should be known about the files in this
toolkit. We have tried to make things like logical name usage, global
symbol usage, temporary file creation, documentation, etc., follow a
consistent plan. Most of this will only matter if system managers
plan to change any of the programs or alter the overall structure of
the kit directories.
This consistent system of naming conventions and common file usage is
only partly implemented. The level of consistency is high but not yet
perfect. All of the programs in the toolkit were developed
independently. Changes have been made in many places to remove
differences in style or function, but this process is not complete,
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and there are places where consistency is possible but not yet
implemented. We will attempt to remedy this for the next release of
the toolkit. It makes maintenance and use of the programs much
easier.
The first, and most obvious, standard practice is that all command
procedures, and some programs, will print out the version number of
the toolkit as soon as they are started. This should help prevent
confusion when future releases of this system are made (we anticipate
at least one more) and should allow easy identification of programs
belonging to this set.
Almost all of the programs and procedures included in the kit make
reference to directories through logical names. The names needed are
defined in the file SECURITY LOGICALS.COM in the top level toolkit
directory. This file must be executed such that the logical names are
defined for any process making use of toolkit programs. One may call
this procedure from a personal LOGIN.COM file, call it manually after
logging in, put the call in the system LOGIN.COM (SYLOGIN.COM), or
call it with "/SYSTEM" as a parameter from the system startup
procedure to define the names as system logicals. It does not matter
how the logicals are defined as long as any process using the toolkit
has them in one of its logical name tables or in the system table. If
they are not defined, then when used most of the toolkit programs will
return an error message indicating that the logicals are not
completely defined or are the wrong version (this is for future
release of the toolkit).
Another practice followed throughout the toolkit is the removal of
comments from most .COM files. Comments slow the execution of command
procedures and are only needed changes are being made to the programs.
There is a command procedure in the utilities directory, called
DECOMM.COM, that will strip the comments from procedure files. In the
process it renames the original .COM file with a .SRC extension and
produces a new .COM file, which is identical except for the missing
comments. The .SRC files are kept in the [.SOURCE] subdirectories for
use when changes are needed or for describing how the procedure works.
Some procedures retain their comments and do not have a .SRC
equivalent. These are mostly limited to program build procedures,
very short procedures, and the logical and symbol definition
procedures in the top level directory. DECOMM also aids in debugging
command procedures by allowing conditional inclusion of "debug lines."
See the DECOMM.SRC file for details.
All of the command procedures in the kit that require modification
before use, such as SECURITY8SECLOG:SECLOG_DEFINITIONS.COM, have all
of the lines that need changing as close to the beginning of the file
as possible (consistent with readability and other standard
practices). The section with the site-specific changes will also be
marked as such, with instructions on what to change and what sort of
values should be used.
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Many of the procedures in the kit may be run as part of a daily batch
job. To avoid the necessity of reading the batch log files produced
by such a method of operation, many of the procedures are designed to
send their final results to the appropriate people using VMS Mail.
The procedures that work this way will look for a file called
SECURITYSDIR:SECURITY.DIS. If the file exists, it will be used as a
mail distribution file. If the file does not exist, the message will
be sent to SYSTEM.
Exactly which of the tools contained in the kit should be implemented
first? That depends on the situation. If one suspects that users are
not choosing secure passwords, then TAP is a good first step. If the
system is being swamped by security alarm messages every morning, then
SECLOG might be best. Not all systems will need everything in the
kit, and each system may have a different priority list.
The best first step is probably to read the .DOC files for each of the
systems and utilities, or the .SRC files for things such as
SAFETERM.COM, which do not have .DOC files, and learn what they do.
Then decide on the best order of implementation for the system.
6.4 License Agreement
The SPAN Security toolkit is distributed on a one-by-one basis. All
SPAN system managers must sign and agree to the license agreement. To
request the toolkit, please do the following:
Send electronic mail to:
NCF::NETMGR
or NSSDCA::NETMGR
or NSSDC::NETMGR
or call:
(301) 286-7251 or FTS 888-7251
or send postal mail to:
SPAN Network Information Center
SPAN Operations Center
NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center
Code 630.2
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771 USA
53
SPAN SECURITY TOOLKIT
After the request is received, the following steps will be taken:
o The license agreement will be mailed to the individual
requesting the software (see Attachment A)
o Information requested in the license agreement will be agreed
upon by the recipient; and an electronic signature block and
host information will be filled in, and the form will be
mailed back to NCF::NETMGR
o Someone within the SPAN networking team at GSFC will tell the
system manager the directory path to use to get the toolkit
on the system.
o A phone call or mail message will be sent letting the remote
node manager know that the software was copied to the system
and requiring that the software be secured on the host.
The above steps will help the SPAN networking team keep the SPAN
Network Information Center On-Line Data Base up to date with
host-related information.
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ATTACHMENT A
License Agreement for the SPAN Security Toolkit
This Agreement is made by and between the NASA/Goddard Space Flight
Center, National Space Science Data Center (NSSDC), Greenbelt,
Maryland 20771 (hereinafter "NSSDC"), and the SPAN Remote Node System
Manager/Administrator (hereinafter "Recipient") of this Agreement.
Whereas, NSSDC has developed software or modified publicly available
software, including programs and supporting documentation, designated
as the SPAN Security Toolkit (hereinafter "Toolkit").
Whereas, the Toolkit was designed to enhance the awareness of computer
security of the VAX/VMS System Manager/Administrator. (The Toolkit is
not designed to be a single comprehensive answer to the problem of
maintaining system security.)
Whereas, users of the Toolkit within the SPAN community have determined
that this software is useful in enhancing their ability to maintain
system security for VAX/VMS V4.x machines, and that further development
should be fully supported, including adaptation to VMS V5.x.
Whereas, NSSDC is willing to allow the Recipient access to said
Toolkit for the above-stated purposes subject, however, to certain
constraints hereinafter stated;
Now, therefore, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. The Recipient shall not use, disclose, copy, distribute or release
the Toolkit for use on any VAX/VMS System other than the system
designated in Enclosure 1; or allow it to be used, disclosed, copied or
released to any VAX/VMS System other than the system designated in
Enclosure 1. These prohibitions apply to members of the Recipients
organization as well as others.
2. NSSDC may, but is not required to, provide software updates to the
Recipient as they are developed.
3. The Recipient shall be responsible for installation, and reporting
the following to NSSDC; within one month after receipt of the Toolkit:
a. Installation problems;
b. Errors found in the software with respect to programs
and documentation;
c. A summary explanation and additional detailed documentation
covering all enhancements made by the Recipient to the
Toolkit;
55
SPAN SECURITY TOOLKIT
d. Suggestions for possible enhancements or improvements to
the Tookit, supported by reasons why the Recipient believes
such to be advantageous.
4. Recipient accepts said toolkit as is. NSSDC makes no representations
or warranties regarding the use or performance of said software and
expressly makes no warranty or merchantability of fitness for a particular
purpose.
5. In no event will NSSDC be liable for any damages resulting from
activities related to performance under this Agreement.
6. In no event will NSSDC be liable for any fees or costs for
activities related to performance under this Agreement.
7. Recipient shall supply NSSDC with the information requested in
Enclosure 1 before distribution of the Toolkit.
8. This agreement is the entire agreement of the parties hereto
relating to the Toolkit software. Any changes must be made in writing
and agreed to by both NSSDC and the Recipient.
9. Provisions of this Agreement relating to use, disclosure, copying,
distribution and release shall be perpetual.
NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center
SPAN Network Information Center
Code 630.2
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
ATTN: Ron Tencati
SPAN Security Manager
e-mail: NCF::NETMGR (DECNET)
Recipient Electronic Signature:
NAME:
JOB TITLE:
INSTITUTION:
DATE:
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SPAN Network Information Center (SPAN_NIC)
On-Line Data Base System
Please supply us with the following information about your SPAN host:
a) NODE NAME:
b) NODE NUMBER:
c) ROUTING TYPE:
(ex: AREA, ROUTING IV, NONROUTING IV etc...)
d) ROUTING CENTER:
(ex. ARC, ESOC, GSFC, JPL, JSC, KSC, MSFC)
e) HARDWARE:
(ex. VAX 11/xxx, MICROVAX xx, IBM xxx, etc...)
f) SOFTWARE VERSION:
(ex. VMS V4.5, UNIX, etc...)
g) BUILDING/ROOM (MACHINE LOCATION):
h) DEFINED SPAN_WIDE (Y or N):
(Do you want other NODEs to be able to access this info)
i) CONTACT PERSONS NAME:
(Systems Manager name)
j) CONTACT PERSONS POSITION:
(Systems Manager title)
k) CONTACT SPAN ADDRESS:
(ex. for me it would be NCF::NETMGR)
1) CONTACT PERSONS PHONE NUMBER:
m) SECURITY PERSONS NAME:
(should be person responsible for security of your system)
n) SECURITY PERSONS TITLE:
o) SECURITY PERSONS SPAN ADDRESS:
(ex. for me it would be NCF::NETMGR)
p) SECURTIY PERSONS PHONE NUMBER:
q) SCIENCE CONTACTS NAME:
r) SCIENCE CONTACTS TITLE:
s) SCIENCE CONTACTS SPAN ADDRESS:
(ex. for me it would be NCF::NETMGR)
t) SCIENCE CONTACTS PHONE NUMBER:
Institution Mailing Address
u) INSTITUTION:
v) DEPARTMENT:
w) STREET:
(street address for Institution)
x) CITY:
y) STATE:
z) ZIP CODE:
aa) COUNTRY:
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bb) DISCIPLINE:
Possible Disciples are as follows:
Astronomy
Gamma Ray Astronomy
Ultraviolet Astronomy
Infrared Astronomy
Radio Astronomy
Earth Science
Atmosphere
Interior and Crust
Planetary Science
Planetary Geophysics
Small Bodies
Solar Physics
Radio Observations
Infrared Observations
Ultraviolet Observations
Gamma Observations
Space Physics
X-Ray Astronomy
Visible Astronomy
Microwave Astronomy
Cosmic Ray Astronomy
Land
Ocean
Planetary Atmospheres
Fields and Particles
Microwave Observations
Visible Observations
X-Ray Observations
Ionospheric Science
cc)
Magnetospheric Science
Interplanetary Studies
LINKS TO OTHER NETWORKS (NETWORK NAME/NETWORK TYPE):
(ex. ARPAnet, BITnet, NICEnet, SESnet, etc...)
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FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
The National Space Science Data Center (NSSDC) located at the Goddard
Space Flight Center has an online network information center called
SPAN_NIC. The services provided in the online data base system are
as follows:
1. General/administrative information on SPAN
2. How to access other network information centers
3. Query SPAN NIC data base for node information
4. SPAN important news briefs
5. SPAN InterMAIL addresses — proper syntax
6. SPAN documentation library
7. Submit node's information for inclusion in SPAN_NIC data base
If you want to log into the SPAN_NIC data base system, you can do the
following:
$ SET HOST NSSDCA <cr>
USERNAME: SPAN NIC <cr>
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